Algebraic Semantics for Propositional Awareness Logics by Piermont, Evan
Algebraic Semantics for Propositional
Awareness Logics.
Evan Piermont∗
October 17, 2019
Abstract
This paper puts forth a class of algebraic structures, relativized Boolean
algebras (RBAs), that provide semantics for propositional logic in which
truth/validity is only defined relative to a local domain. In particular, the
join of an event and its complement need not be the top element. Nonethe-
less, behavior is locally governed by the laws of propositional logic. By fur-
ther endowing these structures with operators—akin to the theory of modal
Algebras—RBAs serve as models of modal logics in which truth is relative. In
particular, modal RBAs provide semantics for various well known awareness
logics.
Key words: Relativized Boolean Algebras; Awareness Frames; Awareness Log-
ics.
1 Introduction
In many logical settings, it is desirable that truth and validity are not defined glob-
ally, but relative to some local domain. For example, one may not want to discuss the
properties of objects when they do not exist, or the necessity, knowledge, or obligation
of statements when they are not defined. However, we may still want the logic to
behave in a classical manor when examined locally, that is, when fixing the domain.
This relative definition of truth has become commonplace in the epistemic formaliza-
tion of (un)awareness, where an agent’s reasoning is restricted by her awareness but is
otherwise rational.
This paper puts forth a class of algebraic structures, relativized Boolean algebras
(RBAs), that provide semantics for propositional logic in which truth is only defined
relative to a local domain, but within a given domain behavior is classical. By further
endowing these structures with operators—akin to the theory of modal algebras or
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Figure 1: The RBA from Example 1. The arrows indicate the partial ordering ≥. The
blue elements compose B, and the red elements, R.
Boolean algebras with operators—RBAs serve as models of modal logics in which truth
is relative. In particular, RBAs with operators provide semantics for various well known
awareness logics.
Like a Boolean algebra and RBA is a set endowed with meet, join, and negation
operations, and bottom and top elements: RB = 〈RB,∧,∨,¬, 0, 1〉. These operations
satisfy the axioms of Boolean algebras except X ∨ ¬X, which we denote by 1X , need
not be the top element, and 0 need not be the identify for ∨. The elements of RBAs
can be ordered via the usual condition Y ≥ X iff X ∧ Y = X.
In place of the Boolean axioms are the weakened versions X∨1 = 1X and X∧0 = 0.
Theorem 1 shows that under these two conditions pi1(X) = {Z | 1Z = 1X} is itself a
Boolean algebra. Hence, if we think of pi1(X) as the domain on which the truth of X
is defined, then within a domain, truth behaves classically. Additionally, RBAs satisfy
one additional property: 1Y ≥ 1X implies ¬(Y ∧ 1X) = ¬Y ∧ 1X . This final property
ensures that if Y ≥ X then Z 7→ Z ∧ 1X is a Boolean homomorphism from pi1(Y ) to
pi1(X). Hence, RBAs are naturally equipped with an ordering on domains and a sense
of projection between them.
Example 1. Let RB consist of the union of the elements of Boolean Algebras, B (for
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blue) and R (for red), generated by the sets {XB, YB, ZB} and {XR, YR}, respectively.
Moreover, define the Boolean homomorphism piR : B → R defined by XB 7→ XR,
YB 7→ YR and ZB 7→ 0R. The operations on RB, when restricted to either Boolean
algebra, coincide with the Boolean operations thereon. For WB ∈ B and WR ∈ R, set
WB ∧WR = piR(WB) ∧WR, and WB ∨WR = piR(WB) ∨WR. The top element is 1B
and the bottom is 0R. This algebra is visualized by Figure 1.
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Consider the proposition p representing “cryptographic protocol x is insecure” and
q representing “there is a quantum algorithm breaking protocol x.” Associate p to the
event XB and q to the event XR. Then RB models the situation in which p is always
either true or false (since ¬XB = YB ∨ ZB so that XB ∨ ¬XB = 1) but q is true or
false only on the local domain where quantum computers exist (since ¬XR = YR so
that XB ∨ ¬XB = 1R 6= 1).
Then, although q → p is defined only when both q and p are (hence on R), it is
still valid in the particular sense that it is true whenever it is defined.
Just as powersets serve as concrete examples of Boolean algebras, given a set W ,
we can defined a concrete RBA over
{(A,B) | B ⊆W,A ⊆ B}.
and with operations defined by
neg. ¬(A,B) = (B \A,B)
meet. (A,B) ∧ (A′, B′) = (A ∩A′, B ∩B′)
join. (A,B) ∨ (A′, B′) = ((A ∪A′) ∩ (B ∩B′), B ∩B′)
Theorem 2 is a Stone-like representation theorem, showing that every RBA can be
embedded into a concrete RBA. This inclusion, for the RBA considered in Example 1
is shown in Figure 2.
As hinted at in Example 1, RBAs serve as models of propositional logic in which
truth and validity are relative by considering a homomorphism, h : L → RB, between
a propositional language, L, and an RBA (i.e., a map such that h(¬ϕ) = ¬h(ϕ),
h(ϕ∧ψ) = h(ϕ)∧h(ψ), etc.) In concrete RBAs, the association between the formula ϕ
and the event (A,B) is intended to be thought of as specifying that ϕ is defined at B
1Although every RBA can be constructed as the disjoint union of Boolean algebras and homomor-
phisms between them, as above, these Boolean algebras do not need to be ordered (in the sense that
the homomorphisms are surjective) as in Example 1.
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and true at A. Hence the complement of (A,B) is not (Ac, Bc) but rather (B \A,B)—
the event where ϕ is defined but not true. A similar interpretation holds for the meets
and joins. ϕ is valid in RB if h(ϕ) = (B,B); if ϕ is true wherever it is defined.
{x, y}
{x} {y} {z}
∅
{x, z} {y, z}
{x, y, z}
Figure 2: The RBA from Example 1 as embedded into the CRBA generated by W =
{x, y, z}. The blue arrows are the elements of B and the red the elements of R.
1.1 RBAs and Awareness
There are two interrelated methods of capturing awareness within a formal episte-
mology. First are the models that capture awareness semantically, where knowledge and
awareness is understood in terms of the subsets of a set called a state-space [2; 8; 11].
Second are models that capture awareness syntacticly, where knowledge and awareness
are understood in terms of statements about the world [3; 12; 1; 5].2
In state-space models, knowledge and awareness are represented by operators, fK
and fA that map events (subsets of the state-space) to events. The event that an agent
knows E is fK(E); and that she is aware of event E is fA(E). Dekel et al. [2] showed
that under mild and intuitive conditions on these operators, the only possibility was
being aware of everything or nothing.
To circumvent this impossibility result, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper [8] (HMS)
2There have also been several papers examining the connection/equivalence between extant models
of the two approaches [7; 9].
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and Li [11] consider an ordered set of state-spaces. State-spaces higher in the ordering
project onto the lower spaces, in the sense that they are strictly more expressive. Then,
roughly, an agent in state ω is aware of those events which are in state-spaces lower
in the ordering than the space containing ω. By considering multiple state-spaces,
the definition of truth becomes inherently relative: there are states in which neither an
event nor its complement obtain. Nonetheless, when restricted to events in a particular
state-space, behavior is classical.
Syntactic models of awareness, conversely, are necessarily contingent on a logical
language, L, with two modalities A and K, respectively. The truth of formulas is then
modeled via Kripke frames/models where at each possible world, ω ∈ W , the DM is
aware of a subset of the underlying logical language, A(ω) ⊆ L, and considers a subset
of the worlds R(ω) ⊆ W , possible. Often each state ω in endowed with only a subset
of the full language, L(ω), and ϕ ∈ L is modeled as true of false only at those states
where ϕ ∈ L(ω) [13; 6; 4]. Again, truth is relatively defined: the worlds where ¬ϕ is
true is the relative complement of those worlds where ϕ is true—relative to the worlds
where it is defined. Validity is likewise relative; ϕ is considered valid if it is true in all
states where it is defined.
To accommodate reasoning about knowledge (and awareness), we can enrich an
RBA, RB, with an operator, a function fK : RB → RB. The interpretation is as
in the state-space models, or indeed in the more general theory of modal algebras:
fK(X) is the element representing knowledge of the element X. We require that fK
respects meets, maps the top element to itself, and that fK(X) ∈ pi1(X). The first
two conditions represent the standard properties of modalities in normal modal logics:
the K axiom and necessitation, respectively. The final requirement constitutes that
knowledge of an element must be defined in the same domain as the element itself. From
fK we can define fA, representing awareness, as fA(X) = fK(1X). The definition of
fA, in addition to ensuring that awareness is domain specific, also embodies a weakened
form of necessitation: the agent knows all (and only) tautologies she is aware of.
Example 2. Take the RBA from Example 1 and consider the map, fK : RB → RB
as given by fK(XR) = f
K(YR) = 0R, f
K(XB) = fK(YB) = 0B, f
K(XB ∨ ZB) =
fK(YB ∨ ZB) = ZB and which coincides with the identity map everywhere else. This
is visualized by the left side of Figure 3. Then fA is simply the map W 7→ 1W .
Going back to our propositions p and q, from example 1, fK represents the state
of affairs in which an agent who is aware of quantum computers (i.e., is aware of q) is
necessarily uncertain about the security of the protocol (i.e., does not know p). This
is because the two elements resolving the truth of p and representing awareness of q,
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Figure 3: On the left, the RBA from Example 1 endowed with the operator fK from
Example 2, as represented by the arrows. The right side shows a Kripke frame where
the awareness sets are the languages generated by the propositions modeled and the
accessibility relation, R, is partitional and given by the lines above the worlds. The
(Boolean) algebra generated by the red worlds is R, and by the blue, B. The association
of ϕ 7→ {ω|ω |= ϕ}, produces the same model as in Example 1, and fK , from Example
2, then corresponds to X 7→ {ω | R(ω) ⊆ X}.
namely, XR and YR, are known only at the bottom element. Conversely, an agent who
is unaware of q may be certain of ¬p; this is represented by ZB.
Propositions 6 and 7 show that modal RBAs are equivalent to awareness frames
(Kripke semantics for awareness logics) in exactly the same manner that modal algebras
and Kripke frames are equivalent. For every modal RBA there is an awareness frame
that models the same theories and that constructed out of its ultrafilters. Conversely,
for every awareness frame there is a modal RBA constructed from the powerset of its
worlds and that models the same theories. For example, the concrete RBA that embeds
the RBA from Example 1, itself visualized in Figure 2, models the same theories as the
Kripke frame shown on the right side of Figure 3.
Stringing these constructions together, we obtain a version of the celebrated repre-
sentation theorem of Jonnson and Tarski [10], that every modal RBA can be isomor-
phically embedded into the (modal) concrete RBA constructed from its corresponding
ultrafilter frame. Along the way this shows that the (propositionally generated) aware-
ness logics considered by Fagin and Halpern [3] are complete and sound with respect
to the class of modal RBAs.
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2 Relativized Boolean Algebras
2.1 Preliminaries / Definitions
Call A = 〈A,∧,∨,¬, 0, 1〉 an algebra of Boolean similarity type when A is a set,
0, 1 ∈ A, ∧ and ∨ are binary operations taking A × A → A, referred to as the meet
and join, receptively, and ¬ is a unary operation taking A → A referred to as the
complement. A homomorphism h : A → A′, is a function h : A → A′ that maps
h(1) = 1′ and that respects the operations (i.e., h(X ∧ Y ) = h(X) ∧ h(Y ), etc).
If A is an algebra whose elements are partially ordered by ≥, then a filter, u, on
the algebra A is a subset of A such that (i) 1 ∈ u, (ii) u is ≥-upwards closed and (iii)
if X,Y ∈ u then X ∧ Y ∈ u. A filter is called proper if u is a proper subset of A and
strongly proper it does not contain X ∧ ¬X for any X ∈ A.
An ultrafilter is a filter that (v) is strongly proper and there is no strongly proper
filter, v on A such that u is a proper subset of v. Let F (A) and U (A) denote the set
of filters and ultrafilters on A.3
Of special importance is the class of Boolean algebras (whose elements are gener-
ically referred to as B) that satisfy the axioms of Boolean algebras (see for example
[14]), written here for connivence:
ba1. ∧ and ∨ are associative, communicative, and distributive.
ba2. X ∨ ¬X = 1
ba3. X ∧ ¬X = 0.
ba4. X ∨ 0 = X ∧ 1 = X.
Let BA denote the class of Boolean Algebras. The operations induce a partial ordering
on B via Y ≥ X iff X ∨ Y = Y iff X ∧ Y = X. It is will known that condition (v)
in the definition of an ultrafilter is, for Boolean algebras, equivalent to: for all X ∈ B
either X ∈ u or ¬X ∈ u, but not both.
2.2 Relativized Boolean Algebras
An algebra of Boolean similarity type, RB = 〈RB,∧,∨,¬, 0, 1〉, is a relativized
Boolean algebra if it satisfies the laws below. To expedite their description, set the
following notation 1X ≡ X ∨ ¬X, 0X ≡ X ∧ ¬X, and Y ≥ X iff X ∧ Y = X. Let
pi2(RB) = {1X | X ∈ RB}. For any X ∈ RB let pi1(X) = {Z ∈ RB | 1Z = 1X}.
3In Boolean algebras or other structures where X∧¬X = 0 for all X, there is no distinction between
proper and strongly proper filters.
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rb1. ∧ and ∨ are associative, communicative, and distributive and with ¬ satisfy
DeMorgan’s laws.
rb2. X ∧X = X ∨X = X ∧ 1 = ¬¬X = X.
rb3. X ∨ 1 = 1X .
rb4. X ∧ 0 = 0.
rb5. 1Y ≥ 1X implies ¬(Y ∧ 1X) = ¬Y ∧ 1X .
Let RBA denote the class of relativized Boolean algebras. It is immediate from
(rb2) and (rb4) that 1 ≥ X ≥ 0 for all X. Notice, however, that unlike in Boolean
Algebras, X ∧ Y = X need not be equivalent to X ∨ Y = Y .
Remark 1. If B ∈ BA then B ∈ RBA.
For a Boolean algebra, X ∨ ¬X = 1 irrespective of X, so the join is global, in the
sense that the join of an element and its complement is greater than any other element.
Likewise X∧¬X = 0 for all X. As the name betrays, for a relativized Boolean algebra,
the meet and join operations are relative, in the sense that their identities, i.e., 1X and
0X , depend on the elements on which they are acting. Theorem 1, below, establishes
that the operations of a RBA will obey the laws of Boolean algebras locally, within the
set of elements which have the same operational identities. That is: pi1(X) forms a
Boolean algebra. Moreover, the set these local Boolean structures themselves form a
semi-lattice on which the projections maps are homomorphisms.
Lemma 1. The following are true for all RB ∈ RBA.
(i) ≥ is a weak order.
(ii) If X ≥ Y and X ′ ≥ Y then X ∧X ′ ≥ Y and X ∨X ′ ≥ Y .
(iii) If X ≥ Y then 1X ≥ 1Y and X ∧ 0Y = 0Y .
(iv) If 1X ≥ 1Y then X ∧ 1Y ∈ pi1(Y ).
(v) 1X ∧ 1Y = 1X∧Y = 1X∨Y = 1X ∨ 1Y .
Theorem 1. For each X, pi1(X) = {Z ∈ RB | 1Z = 1X} is a Boolean Algebra (with
1X and 0X as the top and bottom elements, and the inherited operations). Moreover,
the map hX : Y 7→ Y ∧1X is a homomorphism from {Y | 1Y ≥ 1X} to pi1(X) (where the
former is an algebra with 1 and 0X as the top and bottom elements, and the inherited
operations).
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Proof. That pi1(X) is closed under ¬,∧, and ∨ is immediate. That these relations
satisfy (ba1) follows from (rb1). Let Y ∈ pi1(X). Then Y ∨ ¬Y = Y ∨ 1 = X ∨ 1 =
X ∨ ¬X = 1X . Likewise, Y ∧ ¬Y = ¬(Y ∨ ¬Y ) = ¬(X ∨ ¬X) = X ∧ ¬X = 0X .
So (ba2) and (ba3) hold. Finally, consider Y ∧ 1X and Y ∨ 0X . We have Y ∧ 1X =
Y ∧ (Y ∨ 1) = (Y ∧ Y ) ∨ (Y ∧ 1) = Y ∨ Y = Y and also Y ∨ 0X = Y ∨ (Y ∧ ¬Y ) =
(Y ∨ Y ) ∧ (Y ∨ ¬Y ) = Y ∧ 1X = Y , indicating (ba4).
Next, consider the map hX . Lemma 1(iv) states that the image of hX is indeed
pi1(X). Now let 1Y ≥ 1X and 1Z ≥ 1X . We have ¬hX(Y ) = ¬(Y ∧ 1X) = ¬Y ∧ 1X =
hX(¬Y ) by (rb5). We have hX(Y ∧ Z) = (Y ∧ Z) ∧ 1X = (Y ∧ 1X) ∧ (Z ∧ 1X) =
hX(Y ) ∧ hX(Z). The case for ∨ is identical.
2.3 Concrete Relativized Boolean Algebras
Just as the powerset of a set forms the prototypical example of a BA, RBAs can also
be given concrete instantiations as (a subset of) a powerset. A concrete RBA based on
a set W has elements which are of the form (A,B) where both A and B are subsets
of W and A ⊆ B. The operations are relative versions of the usual powerset Boolean
algebra operations: for example ¬(A,B) = (B \A,B).
In this section we will establish a version of Stone’s representation theorem for RBAs,
showing that each RBA can be embedded into a concrete relative Boolean algebra.
If W is a set, let 2W denote 〈{(A,B) | B ⊆W,A ⊆ B},∧,∨,¬, (∅, ∅), (W,W )〉 with
the operations being defined as follows:
neg. ¬(A,B) = (B \A,B)
meet. (A,B) ∧ (A′, B′) = (A ∩A′, B ∩B′)
join. (A,B) ∨ (A′, B′) = ((A ∪A′) ∩ (B ∩B′), B ∩B′)
Let CRBA be the class of all such algebras. It is easy to check that 2W is
a relativized Boolean algebra, with pi2(2W) = {(B,B) | B ⊆ W} ∼= P(W ) and
pi1(A,B) = {(A′, B) | A′ ⊆ B} ∼= P(B) both being Boolean algebras.4 Notice here
that the ordering, ≥, is simply the product ordering on P(W ): (A,B) ≥ (A′, B′) if
and only if A ⊇ A′ and B ⊇ B′. Also notice that 1(A,B) = (B,B) and 0(A,B) = (∅, B).
If u is a filter of RB, then let pi2(u) = u ∩ pi2(RB) and pi1(u,X) = u ∩ pi1(X).
With these definitions, we can can define the following filters on RB, which may not
be ultrafilters themselves but whose projections are either empty or are ultrafilters.
FRB = {u ∈ F (RB) | pi1(u,X) ∈ U (pi1(X)), for all X ∈ pi2(u)}.
4If B = ∅ then we have the trivial algebra where 0 = 1, but this is no problem.
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The following Lemma establishes that we can extend any suitable filter to an element
of FRB. Using this construction, Theorem 2 shows that every RB ∈ RBA can be
embedded into the concrete RBA based on the set FRB. This clearly mirrors the
standard results for representing a Boolean algebra in the powerset of its ultrafilters.
Here, however, the filters we must work with are not ultrafilters, since pi2(RB) need
not be a Boolean algebra (for example, for a given 1X , there may be no 1Y such that
1X ∧ 1Y = 0).
Lemma 2. Let F ∈ F (RB) be strongly proper and let X /∈ F . Then F can be extended
to u ∈ FRB such that pi2(F ) = pi2(u) and X /∈ u.
Theorem 2. The map h : RB→ 2P(FRB) defined by
X 7→ ({u ∈ FRB | X ∈ u}, {u ∈ FRB | 1X ∈ u})
is an injective homomorphism.
Proof. Clearly h(1) = (FRB, FRB). Take h(X) = (A,B) and h(Y ) = (A′, B′). By
(rb3), 1X = 1¬X ; we have {u ∈ FRB | 1¬X ∈ u} = B. If u /∈ B, then ¬X /∈ u, and if
u ∈ B then u ∩ pi1(X) is an ultrafilter on pi1(X). Hence for all u ∈ B, either X ∈ u or
¬X ∈ u. This indicates that h(X) = (B \A,B) as desired.
Since a filter contains X ∧ Y if and only if it contains X and it contains Y , {u ∈
FRB | X ∧Y ∈ u} = A∩A′. Further, by Lemma 1(v), 1X∧Y = 1X ∧1Y , so {u ∈ FRB |
1X∧Y ∈ u} = B ∩B′: h(X ∧ Y ) = (A ∩A′, B ∩B′).
Next, by Lemma 1(v), 1X∨Y = 1X ∧ 1Y , so {u ∈ FRB | 1X∨Y ∈ u} = B ∩ B′,
as well. Now: If u /∈ B ∩ B′, then X ∨ Y /∈ u, and if u ∈ B then u ∩ pi1(X ∨ Y ) is
an ultrafilter on pi1(X ∨ Y ). It is well known that an ultrafilter on a Boolean algebra
contains X ∨ Y if and only if it contains X or it contains Y . This indicates that
h(X ∨ Y ) = ((A ∪A′) ∩ (B ∩B′), B ∩B′), as desired.
Finally to see that h is injective, assume X 6= Y . If 1X 6= 1Y then assume without
loss of generality that 1Y 6≥ 1X . So {1Z | 1Z ≥ 1X , Z ∈ RB} is a strongly proper filter
on RB and can, by Lemma 2, be extended to an element of FRB that does not include
1Y . Thus B 6= B′.
If 1X = 1Y , and (without loss if generality Y 6≥ X), then {Z | Z ≥ X} is a strongly
proper filter on RB not containing Y . By Lemma 2 again, we can extend to an element
of FRB that does not include Y . Thus A 6= A′.
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3 Models of Propositional Logic
For P, a set of propositional variables, let L(P) be the language defined by the
grammar
ϕ ::= p | 1 | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ)
where p ∈ P. We employ the standard logical abbreviations: 0 ≡ ¬1, (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡
¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ) and (ϕ→ ψ) ≡ (¬ϕ∨ψ). For ϕ ∈ L(P) let P(ϕ) collect those propositional
variables which are subformula of ϕ.
In an abuse of notation, we let L(P) also denote the algebra of Boolean similarity
type in which the base set is L(P) itself and the meet, join, and complement operations
and the top and bottom elements being denoted by their grammatical counterparts.
This is the free algebra of Boolean similarity type generated by P.
Say that ϕ ∈ L(P) is valid in RBA, denoted RBA |= ϕ, if for all RB ∈ RBA and all
homomorphisms h : L(P)→ RB we have that h(ϕ) = 1X for some X ∈ B.
Theorem 3. ϕ is a theorem of classical propositional logic if and only if RBA |= ϕ.
Proof. For RB ∈ RBA, let h : L(P) → RB and let h(ϕ) = X for some classical
validity, ϕ. Note that for all subformula, ψ, of ϕ, it must be that 1h(ψ) ≥ 1X (this is
the consequence of Lemma 1). Now, define the homomorphism h′ : L(P)→ pi1(X) via:
h′ : p 7→
(h(p) ∧ 1X) if 1h(p) ≥ 1X0X otherwise.
By Theorem 1, it must be that for all subformula, ψ, of ϕ, that
h′(ψ) = (h(ψ) ∧ 1X) = hX(h(ψ)) ∈ pi1(X).
Since ϕ is a theorem of classical logic and h′ is a homomorphism to pi1(X) ∈ BA, it
must be that h′(ϕ) = 1X , and hence h(ϕ) = 1X as desired.
Completeness follows from Remark 1.
4 Awareness Logics
Let LA,K(P) denote the extension of L(P) to include the modalities A and K:
LA,K(P) is defined by
ϕ ::= p | 1 | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Aϕ | Kϕ.
Consider the following axioms, all of which are standard, and whose merits and
interpretations are discussed in the literature cited in the introduction.
11
Axioms:
K. (Kϕ ∧K(ϕ→ ψ))→ Kψ.
D. ¬K0.
T. Kϕ→ ϕ.
4. Kϕ→ KKϕ.
5A. (¬Kϕ ∧Aϕ)→ K¬Kϕ.
AGP. Aϕ→ Aψ, for all ψ ∈ LA,K(P(ϕ)).
A0. Kϕ→ Aϕ.
KA. Aϕ↔ KAϕ.
Rules of Inference:
MP. From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ (modus
ponens).
Sub. From ϕ infer all of its substitution
instances.
NecK . From ϕ infer Kϕ.
NecAK . From ϕ infer Aϕ→ Kϕ.
Let AX denote the smallest logic containing the tautologies of propositional logic
and AGP∪K∪D∪A0 and which is closed under MP, Sub, and NecAK . AX is the
axiom system considered in [3] when awareness is generated by primitive propositions
and when the accessibility relation is serial.5
5 Awareness Frames and Awareness Models
A awareness frame is a pre-ordered set (W,≥) endowed with a serial binary relation,
R. We will set R(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω | ωRω′}. Although we refer to the elements of W as
worlds or states, note they will not have the standard interpretation of specifying the
truth of all formulas, but will rather model only a subset of the language.
A awareness model for the language LA,K(P) is a awareness frame, (W,≥,R) along
with two functions, L : P → P(W ) and V : P → P(W ) such (i) L(p) is ≥ upwards
closed, and (ii) V (p) ⊆ L(p) for all p ∈ P. Abusing notation let LA,K(ω) = LA,K(L(ω))
specify the language at world ω. It is the content of (i) that if ω ≥ ω′ then LA,K(ω) ⊇
LA,K(ω′).
An awareness model M = (W,≥,R, L, V ) defines, at every ω ∈ W the truth of all
formula in LA,K(ω). Truth is defined recursively via the operator |= as
• 〈M,ω〉 |= p iff ω ∈ V (p),
5Our inclusion of D will, as usual, specify those models where the accessibility relation is serial.
There is no intrinsic problem considering a weaker logic without D (and therefore without any restric-
tion on the accessibility relation), but to obtain a complete and sound axiomatization, we must replace
it with a novel axiom: K0 → Aϕ.
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• 〈M,ω〉 |= ¬ϕ iff 〈M,ω〉 6|= ϕ,
• 〈M,ω〉 |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff 〈M,ω〉 |= ϕ and 〈M,ω〉 |= ψ,
• 〈M,ω〉 |= Aϕ iff for all ω′ ∈ R(ω), ϕ ∈ LA,K(ω′),
• 〈M,ω〉 |= Kϕ iff for all ω′ ∈ R(ω), 〈M,ω′〉 |= ϕ.
For a model M , let V (ϕ) = {ω ∈ W | 〈M,ω〉 |= ϕ} collect the worlds in which ϕ
holds, and L(ϕ) = {ω ∈W | ϕ ∈ LA,K(ω)} the worlds where ϕ is defined. The reuse of
V and L is desired, as V and L are extensions of the functions in the definition of M .
Call ϕ valid in M if it is true everywhere it is defined: if V (ϕ) = L(ϕ). Call ϕ valid
in the class of awareness models, denoted AM |= ϕ, if it is valid in all M .
Theorem 4. ϕ is a theorem of AX iff AM |= ϕ.
The proof relies on a slight variant of the canonical model argument and thus
relegated to the appendix.
The roles of T,4, and 5A are as in standard Kripke frames, axiomatizing the
class of frames wherein R is reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean, respectively. KA
corresponds to the frames such that ω′ ∈ R(ω) and ω′′ ∈ R(ω′) implies that ω′′ ≥ ω′′′
for some ω′′′ ∈ R(ω). In particular, it is true in the class of transitive frames (i.e.,
under AX∪4).
Notice that Necessitation (from ϕ infer Kϕ) is not sound in AM. Indeed, consider
a model M and some valid ϕ which is not in LA,K(ω′) for some ω′. Then if ω′ ∈ R(ω)
with ϕ ∈ LA,K(ω) we have that 〈M,ω〉 |= ϕ (since ϕ was valid and defined at ω, but
not 〈M,ω〉 6|= Kϕ (since ϕ is not defined at ω′, hence 〈M,ω′〉 6|= ϕ). Necessitation is
sound and (along with the other axioms) complete within the class of frames where
R(ω) ⊆ {ω′ ∈ W | ω′ ≥ ω}. However, this class of models is remarkably boring as
evidenced by the validity of ϕ→ Aϕ.
6 Modal RB’s
Let RB be a relativized Boolean algebra. Then (RB, fK) is a modal relativized
Boolean algebra, or MRBA, if
fK : RB → RB
such that the following conditions hold
f1. 1fK(X) = 1X ,
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f2. fK(1) = 1
f3. fK(X ∧ Y ) = fK(X) ∧ fK(Y ).
fD. fK(0X) = 0X .
Let MRBA denote the class of modal RBAs. From fK we can define the additional
map fA : RB → RB via fA : X 7→ fK(1X).
These conditions reflect the properties of knowledge and awareness in relation to
the elements where they are defined: (f1) states that knowledge (and awareness) of an
element is defined exactly when the event itself is defined; (f2) reflects our weakened
form of necessitation: something which is tautological and always defined is always
known; (f3) encodes the distributive property of knowledge. As always, we have that
(f3) implies that fK is monotone. Finally, (fD) instantiates our restriction to non-
trivial knowledge as D did in frame semantics.
If (RB, fK) is a MRBA and h : L(P) → RB is a homomorphism we can extend
h to h+ : LA,K(P) → RB via (inductively) h+(Aϕ) = fA(h+(ϕ)) and h+(Kϕ) =
fK(h+(ϕ)). Then say that ϕ ∈ LA,K(P) is valid in MRBA, denoted MRBA |= ϕ, if
for all (RB, fK) ∈ MRBA and all homomorphisms from h : L(P)→ RB we have that
h+(ϕ) = 1X for some X ∈ RB.
Theorem 5. MRBA |= ϕ iff AM |= ϕ.
The proof of Theorem 5 is the conjunction of the following two propositions. Propo-
sition 6 constructs, for each awareness model, a corresponding MRBA (and homomor-
phism) such that for each formula, (V (ϕ), L(ϕ)) = h+(ϕ). Then, in converse fash-
ion, Proposition 7 constructs an awareness model, for each (RB, fK , h), such that
h+(ϕ) = (V (ϕ), L(ϕ)).
6.1 Powerset MRBAs
If F = (W,≥,R) is an awareness frame, define the concrete MRBA, (2W, fK,R)
and
fK,R : (A,B) 7→ ({ω | RK(ω) ⊆ A) ∩B,B)
Verifying that fK,R here defined satisfies (f1)-(f3) is straight forward. (fD) follows
from the assumption that R is serial.
Proposition 6. Let F = (W,≥,R) and M = (F,L, V ) be an awareness model and
take hM : L(P) → 2W to be the homomorphism defined by h(p) = (V (p), L(p)) then
hM+(ϕ) = (V (ϕ), L(ϕ)).
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Proof. This is done by induction of the structure of formula. We show the inductive
step for Kϕ:
hM+(Kϕ) = fK,R(hM+(ϕ))
= fK,R(V (ϕ), L(ϕ))
= ({ω | R(ω) ⊂ V (ϕ)} ∩ L(ϕ), L(Kϕ))
= ({ω | ω′ ∈ R(ω) =⇒ 〈M,ω′〉 |= ϕ,ϕ ∈ LA,K(ω)}, L(Kϕ))
= (V (Kϕ), L(Kϕ)).
The second equality is our inductive hypothesis. I promise, the other steps are even
simpler.
Proposition 6 proves that MRBA |= ϕ implies AM |= ϕ. To see this, notice that if
MRBA |= ϕ then for every (RB, fK), and for every homomorphism h : L(P)→ RB, we
have h+(ϕ) = 1X for some X ∈ RB. In particular, for each model (F,L, V ) this is true
for 2W and hM : p 7→ (V (p), L(p)). Thus, Proposition 6 requires that V (ϕ) = L(ϕ).
Since this holds for all models, we have that ϕ is valid in AM.
6.2 Ultrafilter Frames
In dual fashion, the next Proposition shows that AM |= ϕ implies MRBA |= ϕ by
constructing an awareness model for each (RB, fK , h) that yield the same validities.
As usual, the worlds will be sets of ultrafilter like objects. By the reasoning outlined
in Section 2, we consider the filters
FRB = {u ∈ F (RB) | pi1(u,X) ∈ U (pi1(X)), for all X ∈ pi2(u)}.
Then, if (RB, fK) ∈ MRBA, define the ultrafilter frame as (P(FRB),≥RB,RRB)
where u ≥RB v iff pi2(u) ⊇ pi2(v) and uRRBv iff fK(X) ∈ u implies X ∈ v.
Proposition 7. Let h : L(P) → RB be a homomorphism and h+ its extension to
LA,K(P) → 2W. Let M = (P(FRB),≥RB,RRB, Lh, V h) where Lh(p) = {u ∈ FRB |
1h(p) ∈ u} and V h(p) = {u ∈ FRB | h(p) ∈ u}. Then for all ϕ ∈ LA,K(P),
Lh(ϕ) = {u ∈ FRB | 1h+(ϕ) ∈ u},
and
V h(ϕ) = {u ∈ FRB | h+(ϕ) ∈ u}.
Proof. As always, the proof is by induction on the structure of formula. This is straight-
forward with the help of the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let u ∈ FRB. Then R(u) ⊆ {v ∈ FRB | X ∈ v} iff fK(X) ∈ u.
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Proof. The if direction is immediate given the definition of R. We show the only if via
its contrapositive: if fK(X) /∈ u then there exists some v ∈ FRB such that fK(X ′) ∈ u
implies X ′ ∈ v and X /∈ v.
Define v− = {X ′ ∈ RB | fK(X ′) ∈ u}. By assumption X /∈ v−. By (f2), 1 ∈ v−,
by (f3) v− is an upset and is closed under meets, hence v− ∈ F (RB). By (fD)
0Y /∈ v− for any Y ∈ RB; so v− is strongly proper. Lemma 2 allows us to extend v−
to v ∈ FRB such that pi2(v) = pi2(v−) and with X /∈ v. F
We first show that for all ϕ, Lh(ϕ) = {v ∈ FRB | 1h+(ϕ) ∈ v}. This is by induction
of the complexity of ϕ. The base case is the definition of L. We will show the cases for
∧ and K (negation is trivial and the argument for A is exactly the argument for K).
Let u ∈ Lh(ϕ ∧ ψ). So, ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ L(u) iff ϕ ∈ L(u) and ψ ∈ L(u). By the
inductive hypothesis, this is iff 1h+(ϕ) ∈ u and 1h+(ψ) ∈ u. Since u ∈ FRB, this is iff
1h+(ϕ) ∧ 1h+(ψ) = 1h+(ϕ)∧h+(ψ) = 1h+(ϕ∧ψ) ∈ u.
Let u ∈ Lh(Kϕ). So, Kϕ ∈ L(u) iff ϕ ∈ L(u). By the inductive hypothesis, this is
iff 1h+(ψ) = 1fK(h+(ψ)) = 1h+(Kψ) ∈ u. Where the second equality is via (f1).
Next, we show that for all ϕ, V h(ϕ) = {v ∈ FRB | h+(ϕ) ∈ v}. Again, this
is by induction of the complexity of ϕ, and again, we will just show the interesting
steps: Let u ∈ V h(Kϕ). So, 〈M,u〉 |= Kϕ; iff for all v ∈ R(u), 〈M, v〉 |= ϕ. By the
inductive hypothesis, this is iff R(u) ⊆ {v ∈ FRB | h+(ϕ) ∈ v}, which, by Lemma 3 is
iff fK(h+(ϕ)) = h+(Kϕ) ∈ u.
Let u ∈ V h(Aϕ). So, 〈M,u〉 |= Aϕ; iff for all v ∈ R(u), v ∈ Lh(ϕ). By the previous
part of the proof (concerning Lh), this is iff R(u) ⊆ {v ∈ FRB | 1h+(ϕ) ∈ v}, which, by
Lemma 3 is iff fK(1h+(ϕ)) = f
A(h+(ϕ)) = h+(Aϕ) ∈ u.
To see that Proposition 7 shows that AM |= ϕ implies MRBA |= ϕ (and thus
completes the proof of Theorem 5), let ϕ be valid in AM and pick your favorite MRBA,
(RB, fK) and homomorphism h : L(P) → RB. Then in particular, ϕ is valid in
M = (P(FRB),≥RB,RRB, Lh, V h), meaning V h(ϕ) = Lh(ϕ). Proposition 7 then
indicates that
{u ∈ FRB | h+(ϕ) ∈ u} = {u ∈ FRB | 1h+(ϕ) ∈ u},
which can only be true if h+(ϕ) = 1h+(ϕ), indicating validity in (RB, h).
A Example 3
Let RB consist of the union of the elements of Boolean Algebras, B (for blue) and
R (for red), generated by the sets {YB,¬YB} and {XR,¬XR}, respectively. Moreover,
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1R
¬XRXR
0R
YB
0B
¬YB
1B
Figure 4: The RBA from Example 3. The arrows indicate the partial ordering ≥. The
blue elements compose B, and the red elements, R.
define the Boolean homomorphism piR : B → R defined by YB 7→ 1R. The operations
on RB, when restricted to either Boolean algebra, coincide with the Boolean operations
thereon. For WB ∈ B and WR ∈ R, set WB ∧WR = piR(WB) ∧WR, and WB ∨WR =
piR(WB)∨WR. The top element is 1B and the bottom is 0R. This algebra is visualized
by Figure 4.
Notice that piR(B) 6= R but rather is the trivial 0− 1 algebra.
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. To show completeness, we follows the usual con-
ical construction with a slight caveat. For the frame, let W c denote the set of all
pairs (Γ,Q) where Γ is a maximally consistent set of formula containing AX in the
language LA,K(Q) and Q ⊆ P. Order W c via (Γ,Q) ≥c (Γ′,Q′) iff Q ⊇ Q′. Con-
struct the relations according to (Γ,Q)Rc(Γ′,Q′) iff {ϕ ∈ LA,K(P) | Kϕ ∈ Γ} ⊆ Γ′
and {ϕ ∈ LA,K(P) | Aϕ ∈ Γ} ⊆ LA,K(Q′). Then to construct the canonical model, set
Lc(p) = {(Γ,Q) ∈ Ωc | p ∈ Q} and V c(p) = {(Γ,Q) ∈ Ωc | p ∈ Γ}. An induction on
the complexity of ϕ shows that, for all (Γ,Q), ϕ ∈ Γ iff 〈M c, (Γ,Q)〉 |= ϕ. The only
nontrivial steps, for Aϕ and Kϕ, are direct consequences of the following lemmas:
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Lemma 4. Fix (Γ,Q). If Aϕ /∈ Γ then there exists a (Γ′,Q′) such that (Γ,Q)R(Γ′,Q′)
and ϕ /∈ Q′.
Proof. Since Γ contains AGP, we have that {ψ | Aψ ∈ Γ} = LA,K(Q′) for some
Q′ ⊂ P. Since Aϕ /∈ Γ, ϕ /∈ LA,K(Q′). Set Γ− = {ψ | Kψ ∈ Γ}. By A0, Γ− ⊆
LA,K(Q′), and by D, Γ− 6= LA,K(Q′). Notice also that, by NecAK , we have that Γ−
contains all tautologies in LA,K(Q). This allows for the standard argument that Γ− is
a consistent set of formulas and can therefore be extended to a maximally consistent
set, Γ′ ⊂ LA,K(Q′). (Γ′,Q′) is the desired world. F
Lemma 5. Fix (Γ,Q). If Kϕ /∈ Γ then there exists a (Γ′,Q′) such that (Γ,Q)R(Γ′,Q′)
and ϕ /∈ Γ′.
Proof. There are two cases to consider. First, if Aϕ /∈ Γ, then by Lemma 4, there is an
assessable world, (Γ′,Q′), such that ϕ /∈ LA,K(Q′), and hence clearly, ϕ /∈ Γ′.
So assume that Aϕ ∈ Γ. Since Γ contains AGP, we have that {ψ | Aψ ∈ Γ} =
LA,K(Q′) for some Q′ ⊆ P. Then consider the set Γ− = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | Kψ ∈ Γ}. Since
Γ contains A0, we have that Γ− ⊆ LA,K(Q′). As usual, Γ− can be extended to a
maximally consistent set, Γ′ in LA,K(Q′). Again, (Γ′,Q′) is the desired world. F
C Other Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
Proof of Lemma 1. Parts (i-iii) are immediate from definitions.
(iv) (X ∧ 1Y ) ∨ 1 = 1X ∧ ((Y ∨ 1) ∨ 1) = 1X ∧ (Y ∨ 1) = 1X ∧ 1Y = 1Y .
(v) 1X ∧ 1Y = (X ∨ 1) ∧ (Y ∨ 1) = (X ∧ Y ) ∨ 1 = 1X∧Y . Further 1X ∨ 1Y =
(X ∨ 1) ∨ (Y ∨ 1) = (X ∨ Y ) ∨ 1 = ¬(¬X ∧ ¬Y ) ∨ 1 = (¬X ∧ ¬Y ) ∨ 1 =
(¬X ∨ 1) ∧ (¬Y ∨ 1) = (X ∨ 1) ∧ (Y ∨ 1) = 1X ∧ 1Y , where the elimination of
negations comes from the fact that X ∨1 = X ∨¬X = ¬X ∨1 via commutativity
and (rb3).
Proof of Lemma 2. We will show that if F ∈ F (RB) is strongly proper, then for all
1X ∈ pi2(F ), ¬X /∈ F then F ′ = {Z ∧ Y | Z ≥ X,Y ∈ F} is in F (RB) and is strongly
proper and pi2(F ) = pi2(F
′) and ¬X /∈ F ′. This suffices, since we can then appeal to
the usual Zornesque arguments, to choose a maximal element of the partial order of all
extensions.
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That F ′ is upwards closed, contains 1, and is closed under intersections is immediate.
Thus, we need only show that F ′ is strongly proper. Assume to the contrary that
Z ∧ Y = 0W for some W ∈ RB with Z ≥ X and Y ∈ F . Then {1Z , 1Y } ∈ F and so to
is 1V = 1Y ∧ 1X and Y ∧ 1V . Since Z ∧ Y = 0W we have also that6
(Z ∧ 1V ) ∧ (Y ∧ 1V ) = 0W ∧ 1V = 0V . (1)
Now, (Z ∧ 1V ) ≥ (X ∧ 1V ), the fact that pi1(V ) ∈ BA and (1) requires that ¬(X ∧
1V ) ≥ (Y ∧ 1V ). But, since F was upwards closed, this requires that ¬X ∈ F , since
¬X ≥ ¬X ∧ 1V = ¬(X ∧ 1V ) (by (rb5)). This contradicts our assumption.
Clearly, pi2(F ) ⊆ pi2(F ′), so to see the other direction, let Z ∧ Y = 1W for some
W ∈ RB with Z ≥ X and Y ∈ F . Then by Lemma 1(v), 1W = 1Z ∧ 1Y ≥ 1X ∧ 1Y
and so 1W ∈ pi2(F ).
6That 0W ∧ 1V = 0V follows from the fact that hV given by Lemma 1 is a homomorphism.
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